Win employees' loyalty means win everything

This really is a very nice book, with fabulous photgraphy which makes the book worth every penny of its price. The book was written just before the admission of women to its school, and therefore focuses on it being an all male school.

One of the things I loved about this book is how contemporary it is. Normally when I have picked up books on military colleges, the author spends pages and pages going on about the schools hisotry and its early formation and those who were involved in it. A miniscule amount of time is spent looking at the lives of cadets and how the school is structured (such was the case with Drawing out the Man, a historical book by a VMI grad). Fortunetly this is not the case with the Institute. The book looks at the lives of Rats (first year cadets) as it is right now and their transitions through the school.

This book has also taught me how far VMI has come. VMI is not afraid of positive making positive changes. Unlike another somewhat infamous military college. VMI will shed some of it more archaic traditions in order to be welcoming to others (There were several shots of multi-ethnic cadets). The school has seemed to shed some of its old emphasis on worhipping the Confederate Old South. And has now turned into a school dedicated to educating young people and building them up with character and fortitude. Which in my eyes is what makes this school truly great and unique.

I am too old to attend VMI now, but if I could I would quickly enter.

Rah! Rah! VMI

An exellent book on an important subject-worth picking up.

In this uniformly excellent volume, Hugo A. Meynell mounts an argument for the existence of God as an explanation for the intelligibility of the world.

This argument is not the same as the recent (though also interesting) case for "intelligent design" mounted by William Dembski. Meynell's case is more general, and applies even in the absence of any evidence of such design (though of course such design is consistent with his thesis).

Meynell argues, basically, that (a) it is ultimately incoherent to take the "real world" to be anything other than what we get to know by right reason, and that (b) the existence of a necessarily-existing intelligent Creator is the best explanation for the intelligibility of that "real world." My short summary does not do it justice, but those are the (very) bare bones of his cosmological argument.

Meynell's exposition is extremely thorough. He begins by considering, and curtly dismissing, the common claim that arguments for God's existence are unimportant. He then spends a chapter considering standard arguments and counter-arguments for God's existence before setting forth his own argument.

The meat of that argument is in chapter three, in which he argues at length for the claim I have summarized briefly above: that the "real world" is an intelligible, coherent system which we come to understand through the proper use of reason. Chapter four then passes to God as an explanation for such intelligibility.

Meynell then closes with a cleanup chapter of "paralipomena" ("things left out" of the discussion to that point) and a two-page conclusion summarizing his argument. An appendix deals with A.J. Ayer's arguments against theistic belief in _The Central Questions of Philosophy_.

Meynell does not deal with the "presuppositionalist" view that all such arguments are question-begging, but it must be acknowledged that, strictly speaking, his argument is not _deductively_ valid. However, it does not need to be; what he is actually doing is setting out the absolute, axiomatic presuppositions of reason itself -- and this process is not deduction. (A full reply to the presuppositionalists on this point would take us rather far afield, but we may note briefly that the presuppositionalist argument collapses all reasoning into deductive logic -- a move I do not find terribly credible.)

I could probably manage to disagree with Meynell here and there if I tried. For example, he is at great pains to make clear that his view does not amount to "idealism," but here I think he is relying on a more restrictive view of "idealism" than I would prefer to take. (Nicholas Rescher remarks somewhere that any philosophy denying the existence of unknowable things-in-themselves not susceptible to reason is at bottom a form of idealism; I concur. Meynell seems to be rejecting only _subjective_ idealism, a rejection in which I happily join him.)

Be that as it may, overall this is _the_ best book I know on the argument to an intelligent God from the existence and axiomatic efficacy of human reason. It deserves to be reprinted and widely read by philosophers and theologians of all stripes.

This is a great book that was a real help in getting me through school and in my first jobs afterwards. It provides the clearest explanation of various spatial statistical techniques that I found (after an extensive literature review for a Masters thesis). The software package is great, particularly because it allows the reader to see all the theory in action in a graphical way.

Anthony Clark Arend and Robert Beck have written an intellectually honest piece exploring the use of force under international law. The book begins with a discussion of the development of the law regarding the use of force from ancient times to the writing of the United Nations charter. The book then goes on to fairly examine state behavior since the UN Charter and poses the question: how has custom strayed from the thinking that inspired the Charter and the mechanisms that it set up. They give an objective, balanced overview of the state of law regarding a number of issues from intervention in civil and mixed conflict to rescue of nationals abroad and dealing with terrorists. Though they discuss all sides of the issue, Arend and Beck ultimately conclude that although international law's intentions at the end of World War II were nobel -- and despite the fact that the Charter paradigm still exists on paper -- a realistic assessment of the facts requires the conclusion that the paradigm has been rejected by states through their practices and thereby ceased to be international law.

Not for someone with no legal experiance, but excellent for anyone intrested in International law who is somewhat comfortable with legal phrasing. Great anthology edited by a great scholar.

International Rules is a prime example of a composite being more the sum of its parts. The authors collected writings from the main schools of international law (IL) and international relations (IR) scholarship and provide the reader with the basic analytical tools to ponder the place of rules (and norms) in the international system. In addition to an insightful introduction to each of the eight schools represented (five IL and three IR schools), Professors Beck and Arend wrote an opening (Beck) and closing (Arned) chapter providing a general framework for the discussion. The main problem tackled by the collection is the divergent positions and lack of communication between the fields of international relations and international law. While international law assumes the influence of (though not necessarily compliance with) legal rules on the behavior of its subject (and when it cannot exert such influence, it would no longer be classified as law) this point is, indeed, an open point of discussion among IR scholars. IR's Realists, for example, refuse to accept the influence of rules, rather focusing on power and view whatever rules do exist in the international system as mere reflections of the configuration of power. Even some of the IL schools focus on the influence power has on the formation of rules (IL's Feminists, New Stream and New Haven schools), as Beck aptly points out (pp. 15). Yet, some of the most interesting and groundbreaking work on the enigma of international rules finds no place in the collection. The constructivist program of research in IR focuses on the social determinants of the international system. As such, their work explores, with great detail, such issues as the function of norms and norm emergence, the influence of identity on action in the international arena and on the mutual constitution of the actor and the international system. This school traces its roots to Headly Bull's "The Anarchical Society" and from the late 1980's a flurry of writings on these subjects has emerged. In fact, Arend published an article (Virginia Journal of International Law, Vol. 38, No. 2, 1998, pp.107) and a book (Legal Rules and International Society, 1999) focusing on rules in the international system both of which implement constructivist methods. With the exception of the selection from Keohane setting off the constructivist approach (named by him "reflective"), the selection from Hurrell is really the only one which will give the reader a view into this important body of scholarship (although the select bibliography will set the reader in the right direction). Beyond this obvious shortcoming, there are several smaller ones I feel need to be pointed out. First, bringing Feminist voices to the discussion is laudable, but it is my feeling that the more developed "Third World" voice should not have been overlooked. (see: Third World Attitudes Toward International Law: An Introduction (F. Snyder and S. Sathirathai, Eds.), 1987 and K. Mickelson's "Rhetoric and Rage" article in Wisconsin Int'l Law Journal, Vol. 16 (1998) pp. 353). Second, Beck raises the question of the place of morality in the development of legal norms, yet the selections do not include the work of Lon Fuller, who wrote extensively on this subject. Nonetheless, I feel this book is an excellent starting point for the discussion on the place of norms in the international system and warmly recommend it to anyone with an interest in this subject.

I really like this book. It is very clear, though Thiseleton is constantly referencing philosophers from all throughout history. I am American enough to find myself pining for the bottom line, but I know reading references is good for me because I am getting a lesson in philosophy and history at the same time! The sheer volume of citations in these first two parts testifies to the experience and the patience of Thistleton as a philosopher.

In the first part, he examines the Nietzscheian idea that truth is nothing other than a metaphor that we have forgotten is a metaphor and keep around only in so far as it serves an individual's will to power. He points out that the postmodern fear of manipulation can actually be healthy for the Christian Church, because it will help us to unite against the "Christian Leaders" who are, in fact, merely manipulating people. He also points out that the whole Nietzscheian slave morality thing really just doesn't apply to true Christianity. He gives examples from Bonhoffer and Luther, testifying to the fact that Christianity is not a system of beliefs that calls for its people to remain passive while the Truth is being slandered. And as for manipulation, the New Testament is clear about the fact that false apostles will try to distort the Truth to suit their agenda, but we are not to give them any credit (2 Corinthians and Galatians).

In chapter 5 Thistleton has a lot to say about Wittgenstein and language that is incredibly important. One of the major conclusions of part one is that Truth is usually best interpreted relationally. This is the idea that leads us into part two. In part two, we get a lesson in hermeneutics. This section seems exceedingly long, but that is just because Thistleton is so patient to give credit to all the different thinkers who have contributed to the discussion and all that. What we end up with, however, is fairly simple. It is basically just the exact opposite of Derrida's deconstructionism. In chapter 10, Thiselton gives us 5 interesting theses. 1) We can always tell something about the author when we study a text. 2) The Scriptures speak to our true selves. 3) All texts speak to readers as thinking selves. 4) Different interpretations tell about differences in readers. And 5) The Bible was written to transform our lives, and if we are to understand what it says, we must keep that in mind.

The third part is basically just a refutation of Cupitt's "Sea of Faith Network" stuff. It seems that Cupitt was some sort of religious atheist who got a good deal of press over in Great Britain. Based on what Thiselton had to say about the movement, I really don't even see why Cupitt's ideas were worth the time it took to refute, but I guess because Cupitt wrote more than a book a year for about ten years and had a large following, Thiselton was worried that his ideas may spread.

Part 4 is more constructive, I think, but less clear. It is obvious that Thiselton is a very clear thinker, but he is so faithful in giving credit for borrowed ideas that it is often confusing as to whether Thiselton is presenting someone else's views to refute them (like he did with Cupitt's ideas) or to incorporate their ideas into his thesis. This anal name-dropping really takes a lot away from the readability of this final section, but I think that the basic thesis is clear.

Thiselton starts off by pointing out the fact that it is our duty to translate the Gospel into contemporary language games without compromising the message. He points out that in Nietzsche's day, Christianity was just getting into the whole dualism thing (which was already almost dead in philosophical circles). Christianity was so hung up in antiquated philosophy that Nietzsche and Heidegger dismissed the whole religion as "Platonism for the People" (by the way, this makes me suspect that Nietzsche and Heidegger got their understanding of Christianity entirely through Ron Nash's books).

The point for us today is that Dualism is out, and has been out for a while. Physicalism is in now. We need to give up all this mind/body dualism junk and do our best to translate the Gospel into physicalist terminology. We don't have to agree with all the basic beliefs of Physicalism, but we should never have agreed with the basic beliefs of dualism either! We don't need to let our message get distorted by the secular philosophers, but we need to talk their language so that they can at least understand us! The final chapters of this book are an attempt to show the postmodern subject that what they need is Christianity. Whereas the defining characteristics of postmodernism are cynicism and despair, Christianity offers hope and promise. The Christian can be realistic about how bad the existential situation is because they have hope in a sovereign God, and His promise to work everything out for his good purposes. There is no longer any need to resort to superficial optimism, as the modern subject did, but there is also no need for self-destructive pessimism. Christianity offers the opportunity for honest realism and hope at the same time, and that is what we all need to hear. As Tim Keller likes to say it, "You are worse off than you ever dared to imagine, but God loves you more than you ever dared to hope." That is the radical message of the gospel. We need to tell the world to forget about all that dualistic, superficial, "I don't care if it rains or freezes, 'long as I got my plastic Jesus," nonsense that has been aptly labeled the opiate of the people. What we all need is the radical grace of the Gospel that lets us be real and lets us be optimistic, even as we learn the lessons that postmodernism has to teach us.

This is one of the best reference books on this topic. Just like the King James Bible it is complete and comprehensive.